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LIFE INSURANCE AGENT FRAUD IN
CALIFORNIA: REBATING AND RELATED
MISCONDUCT
Douglas Hallett*
I. INTRODUCTION
In its September 1, 1975 issue, Forbes magazine reported the
following:
In April 1974 Aetna Life & Casualty fired its top salesman,
Bert Kreisberg, who had written over $100 million in new
policies in 1973 alone (roughly 5% of Aetna's new business
that year). Kreisberg was selling multimillion-dollar face-
amount policies with high first-year cash value and then offer-
ing to pay the premiums on that policy himself in exchange
for the cash-value rights. By borrowing on the cash value and
then adding in his commissions and expenses, Kreisberg
wound up with 140% of the first-year premium. To be sure,
he would have netted more than 40% by simply writing those
policies in the ordinary manner, but the market for life insur-
ance policies of such size is exceedingly thin. (Unless, of
course, they're "free" like Kreisberg's.)1
Kreisberg's practices constitute a misdemeanor offense by the
agent2 and, potentially, the policyholder in California.' As in the other
forty-nine states, California law prohibits rebating-that is, providing
an inducement to a prospective insured other than that which is stated
in the policy.4 Kreisberg himself eventually pleaded nolo contendere
* Partner, Adams, Duque & Hazeltine, Los Angeles. B.A., 1971, Yale University;
J.D., 1975, Harvard University. Member, California and District of Columbia Bars.
1. A Salesman Who Was Too Successful, FORBES, Sept. 1, 1975, at 79.
2. CAL. INS. CODE § 761 (Deering 1976) provides that: "Any insurer, insurance agent,
broker, solicitor, or life agent and any officer or employee of an insurer, insurance agent,
broker, or life agent that makes or receives an unlawful rebate is guilty of a misdemeanor."
3. CAL. INS. CODE § 752 (Deering 1976) provides that: "Any person named as the in-
sured in any policy or named as the principal, or obligee, in any surety policy or the agent or
representative of any such person who, directly or indirectly, knowingly accepts or receives
any unlawful rebate is guilty of a misdemeanor."
4. CAL. INS. CODE § 750 (Deering 1976) provides that:
An insurer, insurance agent, broker, or solicitor, personally or by any other party,
shall not offer or pay, directly or indirectly, as an inducement to insurance on any
subject-matter in this State, any rebate of the whole or part of the premium paya-
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to thirteen counts of grand theft for his activities. However, that con-
viction has hardly served as a deterrent to other agents, although there
are no reliable figures on fraudulent agent activity, it is on the upswing.
The number of life insurance companies has tripled over the last
three decades. Inflation and the development of a steadily increasing
variety of investment instruments have undermined the marketability
of traditional whole life products and have led to a mushrooming of
new special risk, term and so-called "universal life" alternatives. Unfa-
vorable economic growth rates and the rise of an underground barter
economy to avoid federal and state taxation present even more induce-
ments for agents' rebating practices. The volatility of interest rates has
increased both the rewards and risks on premium funds agents may
hold for insurers. In addition, the increasing emphasis on deregulation
of the economy has made agent discipline a low priority for insurance
departments in an era of tight state budgets. The net result is that
fraudulent activities by agents are skyrocketing in an environment of
increasing tolerance. The public, insurers, and the vast majority of
trustworthy agents pay the price.
The most obvious form of agent fraud is outright theft-the expro-
priation of premium funds received from an applicant or insured. Such
activity is expressly proscribed by the California Insurance Code
whether it be by an agent5 or administrator.' The other most common
forms of agent fraud involve representations between an agent or ad-
ministrator and an applicant or insured. Rebating, of which Kreisberg
was guilty, and twisting, the making of misrepresentations to an appli-
cant or insured for the purpose of inducing him to let an insurance
ble on an insurance contract, or of the agent's or broker's commission thereon, and
such rebate is an unlawful rebate.
CAL. INS. CODE § 751 (Deering 1976) provides that:
An insurer, or an insurance agent, broker, or solicitor, personally or otherwise,
shall not offer or pay, directly or indirectly, as an inducement to enter into an
insurance contract, any valuable consideration which is not clearly specified, prom-
ised or provided for in the policy, or application for the insurance, and any such
consideration not appearing in the policy is an unlawful rebate.
5. CAL. INS. CODE § 1733 (Deering 1976) provides in pertinent part:
All funds received by any person acting as an insurance agent,. . . as premium or
return premium on or under any policy of insurance... are received and hejd by
such person in his fiduciary capacity. Any such person who diverts or appropriates
such fiduciary funds to his own use is guilty of theft and punishable for theft as
provided by law.
6. CAL. INS. CODE § 1759.6 (Deering Supp. 1982) provides in pertinent part that: "All
insurance charges or premiums collected by an administrator on behalf of or for an insurer
or insurers, and return premiums received from such insurer or insurers, shall be held by the
administrator in a fiduciary capacity."
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contract lapse,7 are the classic proscribed forms of agent misconduct.
They are often intertwined by agents seeking the high first-year com-
missions (as high as 250% of the first-year premiums) some companies
offer on whole life policies. The burgeoning of multiple-employer
trusts and large-scale third-party administrators which not only partici-
pate in the sale but also in the administration of insurance contracts has
led to new problems resulting from unpoliced accounting practices and
misrepresentations that are made to applicants or insureds.
It would be impossible to discuss adequately each variety of insur-
ance agency fraud. All of them, however, ultimately focus on the issue
of the agent's authority. The most important consideration for an in-
surer in most agent fraud situations is the insurer's liability for the in-
surance policies and representations which were made as a result of the
agent's activities. This issue is most clearly brought into focus in the
classic insurance agent crime of rebating. While the other insurance
agent crimes will not be discussed in any detail in this article, it should
be borne in mind that the same issues of agent authority and policy
liability with which the insurer must deal in the rebating situation are
also found in those cases.
II. AGENT AUTHORITY
As with the traditional forms of agent misconduct, an insurance
company's liability for the results of each of these forms of fraud arises
out of the agent's or administrator's authority as defined by law to
make the representations. Therefore, the first line of defense for an
insurer victimized by an agent's fraud is to assert that the agent lacked
authority to make the representation.
Most insurance codes do not deal extensively with the authority of
an insurance agent. The general rule is that the powers of an agent of
an insurance company are governed by the general laws of agency.'
7. CAL. INS. CODE § 781 (Deering 1976) provides that:
A person shall not make any misrepresentation
(a) to any other person for the purpose of inducing, or tending to induce, such
other person either to take out a policy of insurance, or to refuse to accept a policy
issued upon an application therefor and instead take out any policy in another
insurer, or
(b) to a policyholder in any insurer for the purpose of inducing or tending to
induce him to lapse, forfeit or surrender his insurance therein.
A person shall not make any representation or comparison of insurers or policies to
an insured which is misleading, for the purpose of inducing or tending to induce
him to lapse, forfeit, change or surrender his insurance, whether on a temporary or
permanent plan.
8. Downey v. Humphreys, 102 Cal. App. 2d 323, 335, 227 P.2d 484, 492 (1951); Cronin
v. Coyle, 6 Cal. App. 2d 205, 212, 44 P.2d 385, 388 (1935).
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Under California law, "[a]n agent has such authority as the principal,
actually or ostensibly, confers upon him."9 Actual authority is defined
as "such as a principal intentionally confers upon the agent, or inten-
tionally, or by want of ordinary care, allows the agent to believe him-
self to possess. ' ' 0 In most cases, this authority is defined in the agency
contract between the insurer and agent. Typical terms of a standard
agency contract include the following:
AUTHORITY
The Agent shall solicit within said territory for the pur-
pose of procuring applications for life insurance and annuities
on the lives of individuals, which applications shall be sub-
mitted to the Company for consideration, and shall deliver
policies, premium receipts, premium notes, and interest re-
ceipts when sent him by the Company for collection, when the
terms and conditions governing such delivery have been com-
plied with and shall transmit all collections to the Company.
ACCOUNTING
All monies received for the Company by the Agent for
premiums and otherwise, by reason of this agreement, shall
belong to the Company, shall be received and held by the
Agent in a fiduciary capacity only, shall not be used for any
purpose whatsoever other than specified herein, and shall
forthwith be paid over to the Company.
COMMISSIONS
The Company shall pay the Agent as full compensation
for his services and his expenses, the commissions computed
on the premiums paid to and received in cash by the Com-
pany upon policies and annuities procured by the Agent in
accordance with this agreement.
REJECTIONS, MODIFICATIONS, DELIVERIES, COM-
MISSIONS, REFUNDS
The Company, in its discretion, may reject or require the
amendment of any application for insurance. No policy shall
be delivered save during the applicant's good health and after
the first premium shall have been duly settled for. Should the
Company for any reason refund the premium on any policy
or annuity written on an application secured by said Agent,
9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2315 (Deering 1981).
10. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2316 (Deering 1981).
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then the Agent shall refund to the Company any monies re-
ceived by him by reason of the payment of such premium.
ASSIGNMENT
No assignment of this agreement or of commissions or
other payments due or to become due hereunder shall be
binding on the Company unless written acknowledgement of
its filing is issued from the Home Office.
LIMITATIONS
The Agent shall not have authority on behalf of the
Company to make, alter or discharge any policy or other con-
tract, to waive any forfeiture nor to grant permits, nor to ex-
tend the time of paying any premium or premium note; nor to
guarantee dividends; nor to receive any monies or premiums
due, or to become due, to the Company, except on policies or
annuity contracts, premium receipts, premium notes or other
items which have been sent him by the Company for collec-
tion; nor shall the Agent issue or circulate any advertisements
or literature unless the same shall have been first approved in
writing by the Company; nor alter the forms which may be
sent to the Agent by the Company in connection with the
business nor substitute other forms in place of those used by
the Company; nor expend nor contract for the expenditure of,
the funds of the Company except as expressly authorized by it
in writing; nor shall the Agent possess or exercise any author-
ity on behalf of the Company other than that expressly con-
ferred upon him by this agreement.
NOTES
The Agent is not authorized to accept notes, except as
specifically authorized by the Company and then only on
forms provided by it. Should he do so, he shall immediately
pay over to the Company the amount due on items for which
such notes have been accepted, and shall hold said note solely
at his own risk.
RELATIONSHIP
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to create the
relation of employer and employee between the Company
and the Agent. Within the territory above described, the
Agent shall be free to exercise his own judgment as to the
persons from whom he will solicit insurance and annuity con-
tracts and the time and place of such solicitation, but the
Company may from time to time prescribe rules and regula-
1984]
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tions respecting the conduct of the business covered hereby,
not interfering with such freedom of action of the Agent, and
the Agent agrees to be governed thereby.
TERMINATION
Either party may terminate this agreement by a notice in
writing mailed or delivered at least thirty days prior to the
date of termination to or at the last known address of the
other party; in which event a settlement shall, at the expira-
tion of such thirty days, be had between the parties hereto.
The Agent agrees that fraud, malfeasance, misappropriation
or withholding of funds by the Agent or his wilful neglect of
any duty or obligation hereunder, or retaining of policies, re-
ceipts, books or other property of the Company after demand
therefore shall have been made by the Company or its author-
ized representative, shall forthwith, at the option of the Com-
pany, terminate this agreement, in which even an immediate
settlement shall be had between the parties hereto.
If the Agent's license to solicit insurance for the Com-
pany issued by any State Authority is not renewed while this
contract is in force such non-renewal shall operate as a sus-
pension of all the Agent's rights to further solicit insurance
hereunder until such license shall have been renewed.
An agent, in addition to the authority expressly authorized by the
principal, has certain authority conferred by law." This includes the
authority:
1. To do everything necessary or proper and usual, in the
ordinary course of business, for effecting the purpose of his
agency; and,
2. To make a representation respecting any matter of fact,
not including the terms of his authority, but upon which his
right to use his authority depends, and the truth of which can-
not be determined by the use of reasonable diligence on the
part of the person to whom the representation is made. 2
By this reasoning, the powers of an insurance agent are coexten-
sive with the business entrusted to his care.' 3 There is law to the effect
11. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2318 (Deering 1981) provides that, "[e]very agent has actually
such authority as is defined by this title, unless specially deprived thereof by his principal,
and has even then such authority ostensibly, except as to persons who have actual or con-
structive notice of the restriction upon his authority."
12. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2319 (Deering 1981).
13. Frasch v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 213 Cal. 219, 223, 2 P.2d 147, 148
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that unless limitations of authority are brought to the attention of an
applicant or an insured, the insurer is bound to the agent's representa-
tion. ' 4 However, this law arises in the context of representations within
the normal scope of agency, not fraudulent acts. Section 2306 of the
California Civil Code states that: "[a]n agent can never have authority,
either actual or ostensible, to do an act which is, and is known or sus-
pected by the person with whom he deals, to be a fraud upon the prin-
cipal.""5 In any event, when limitations of the authority of an agent
appear in writing, such as normally appear in insurance policies as well
as agency contracts, the insured is presumptively charged with knowl-
edge of the terms. 6 Thus, an acceptance by an applicant of a policy
clearly defining the limitations placed on the agent usually charges the
applicant with knowledge of the limitations. 7 Most insurance policy
contracts contain such limiting terms stating that the agent is not au-
thorized to alter the terms of the contract. A typical limitation in an
insurance policy contract states:
No agent or other person, except the President, a Vice Pres-
ident, the Secretary, an Actuary, an Associate Actuary, an As-
sistant Secretary, or an Assistant Actuary, of the Company,
has authority to extend the time for payment of a premium or
interest; to make or modify a contract; to waive a forfeiture;
or to bind the Company by making any promise or represen-
tation or by giving or receiving any information.
Notwithstanding such clear limitations of agent authority, the in-
surer may still be bound to the agent's representations by the doctrine
of ostensible authority. Ostensible authority is defined as "such as
principal, intentionally or by want of ordinary care, causes or allows a
third person to believe the agent to possess."' 8 The doctrine of ostensi-
ble authority rests upon the doctrine of estoppel. Its essential elements,
therefore, are: (1) representations by the purported principal; (2)justif-
able reliance on those representations by a third party; and (3) change
of position or injury resulting from such reliance.' 9
(1931); Skyways Aircraft Ferrying Serv., Inc. v. Stanton, 242 Cal. App. 2d 272, 281, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 352, 358 (1966) (quoting Frasch).
14. See Financial Indem. Co. v. Murphy; 223 Cal. App. 2d 621, 627, 35 Cal. Rptr. 913,
916-17 (1963).
15. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2306 (Deering 1981).
16. Porter v. General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 30 Cal. App. 198, 203,
157 P. 825, 827 (1916).
17. Iverson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 151 Cal. 746, 750-51, 91 P. 609, 611 (1907).
18. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2317 (Deering 1976).
19. Hartong v. Partake, Inc., 266-Cal. App. 2d 942, 960, 72 Cal. Rptr. 722, 734 (1968).
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Under standard insurance agency contracts, an agent usually has
authority to accept premium funds from an insured. This leads to al-
most certain liability on the part of an insurer for a policy issued to an
insured even if the agent misappropriates the premium funds himself.
The innocent insured has no reason to believe that the agent will mis-
appropriate the funds and the insurer has committed on the agent such
incidents of authority which would indicate to the insured that the
agent does have the authority to collect premium funds. A more diffi-
cult case occurs when an agent seeks to induce a prospective insured to
turn over premium funds in return for a waiver of policy provisions.
For example, an applicant may note that a health question on the in-
surance application calls for disclosure of information which may cause
the applicant to be rejected. If the agent were to tell the applicant that
the term could be waived and that he or she need not provide the infor-
mation, the insurer's defense to a claim under the insurance contract
would depend on how clearly the application indicates that the agent
has no authority to make such a waiver. If the applicant were on clear
notice of the agent's lack of authority, the insurer would not be bound
to the contract. On the other hand, if clear notice is not given, the court
might well find the company liable under the policy.20
Unauthorized actions by an agent can also be subsequently ratified
20. An illustration of this principle is found in Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v. Coats, 4
Cal. 2d 319, 48 P.2d 663 (1935), where a vendor sued vendee to recover the balance due on a
power shovel. The vendee's defense was based on vendor's agent's fraud. The sales contract
contained the following provision:
This agreement shall not be considered as executed, and shall not become effective
until accepted by the vendee, and executed and approved by the president, or vice-
president, or secretary of the vendor, and it is hereby further declared, agreed and
understood that there are no prior writings, verbal negotiations, understandings,
representations or agreements between the parties not herein expressed.
Id. at 320, 48 P.2d at 663.
In reversing the lower court's judgment for plaintiff notwithstanding the jury verdict for
defendant, the supreme court held that:
[A]n innocent principal might by such a stipulationprotect himself from liability in
a tort action for damages for fraud and deceit, but that the third party would nev-
ertheless be entitled to rescind the contract. .. The principal would normally be
liable in tort for misrepresentations by an agent acting within the scope of his ac-
tual or ostensible authority, and by stipulating in the contract that the agent has no
such authority, the principal has done all that is reasonably possible to give notice
thereof to the third party. Under such circumstances the innocent principal may
justly be relieved of liability for the agent's wrong.
Id. at 320-21, 48 P.2d at 663 (emphasis in original).
In 1977, the California Legislature added section 1759 et seq. to the Insurance Code
outlining definitions and rules for insurance administrators. In section 1759.2, the Legisla-
ture statutorily embodied the principle that receipt by an administrator of a premium consti-
tutes receipt by an insurer, but is no more forthcoming with respect to the issues of authority.
CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1759-1759.10 (Deering Supp. 1983).
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by a principal. In this regard, section 2307 of the Civil Code states that
"[a]n agency may be created, and an authority may be conferred, by a
precedent authorization or a subsequent ratification." The question
then becomes what actions are sufficient to establish ratification by a
principal.
In order for a principal to ratify the unauthorized acts of its
"agent," it must engage in confirmatory conduct, or, at the very least,
conduct which is necessarily inconsistent with a claim of disapproval.
In determining the nature of the principal's conduct, inconclusive or
ambiguous acts should not serve as the basis for ratification nor should
facts be stretched to find a basis for ratification."z Ratification requires
that the agents were acting on behalf of the insurer.22 Put in another
way, it is an essential element of ratification that the principal have
some knowledge of the unauthorized act of its agent (or a deliberate
lack of knowledge) and of the material consequences of the act.
23
A principal's failure to anticipate that its agents will act far in ex-
cess of their authority is not, without more, negligence such as would
create either ostensible authority or constructive knowledge to support
ratification. 4 The normal rule is that the authority of an agent cannot
be established merely by the representations of the agent.25 And per-
sons dealing with an agent are bound at their peril to ascertain not only
the fact of agency but the nature and extent of authority beyond that
which is usual and customary. 6
III. LIABILITIES UNDER INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN CASES OF
AGENT FRAUD
As noted above, the biggest risk to the insurer in most insurance
fraud schemes by agents is liability under the policies themselves.2 7 Re-
bating, twisting and premium trust fund violations may be accompa-
21. Gates v. Bank of America, 120 Cal. App. 2d 571, 576, 261 P.2d 545, 547 (1953).
22. Schomaker v. Petersen, 103 Cal. App. 558, 570, 285 P. 342, 347 (1930).
23. Johnson v. California Interurban Motor Transp. Ass'n, 24 Cal. App. 2d 322, 336-37,
74 P.2d 1073, 1080-81 (1938).
24. Cignetti v. American Trust Co., 139 Cal. App. 2d 744, 748-49, 294 P.2d 490, 492-93
(1956).
25. Hilyar v. Union Ice Co., 45 Cal. 2d 30; 42, 286 P.2d 21, 28 (1955) (quoting Fesler v.
Rawlins, 43 Cal. App. 2d 541, 544, 111 P.2d 380, 382 (1941)).
26. Torrance Nat'l Bank v. Enesco Fed. Credit Union, 134 Cal. App. 2d 316, 324, 285
P.2d 737, 742 (1955) (quoting Ernst v. Searle, 218 Cal. 233, 240, 22 P.2d 715, 717 (1933)).
27. Refusal to pay claims may also lead to tort liability. Recently, a San Diego jury
awarded a plaintiff$10 million in punitive damages and $350,000 in emotional distress dam-
ages when an insurer refused to pay on a $1 million life policy issued pursuant to an agent
rebate. The jury found that the beneficiaries had reasonably relied on misrepresentations of
19841
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nied by a large volume of insurance contracts with liabilities extending
into the millions of dollars. This potential liability is a far more impor-
tant area of consideration for the insurer than any loss of commissions
in excess of premiums received. In cases of premium trust fund viola-
tions, unless clear misrepresentations accompany the theft, the insurer
may have difficulty avoiding policy liability. Because the agent nor-
mally has the authority to accept premiums on behalf of the insurer,
the insurer is ordinarily bound to the policy risk.28 However, if the
insured is involved in the agent misappropriation, the analysis dis-
cussed below for rebating and twisting situations may be applied.
In suspected cases of rebating and twisting, the insurer must make
an early and careful analysis. Once on notice of a rebating and twisting
situation, the insurer must make this analysis very quickly in order to
avoid potential arguments by the insured that it ratified the acts of the
agent.29 Early analysis-even if without complete information-is
therefore absolutely essential to the insurer's determination of how to
react to the situation. In most cases, a decision to seek rescission of the
policies will mean a decision to pursue the agents, if only to assist in
getting the policies rescinded. By the same token, a decision not to
rescind the policies because of the cost-benefit analysis will generally
mean a decision not to pursue the agents.
Although certain provisions of the California Insurance Code pro-
vide a right of rescission in some circumstances, none is specifically
applicable to a rebating or twisting situation."0 However, the Insurance
Code does not provide that it is the sole body of California law gov-
erning insurance contracts within the state. It provides only that "[a]ll
insurance in this State is governed by the provisions of this code"'3 I and
that "[t]he provisions of this code in so far as they are substantially the
the agent. Hutton Unit Loses Decision in Rebate Case, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 2, 1983, at
2.
28. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text; see also Hughes, Trial Tactics in De-
fending Life Insurers, 17 FORUM 1081, 1082-83 (1981-82).
29. See supra text accompanying note 22.
The insurer must also note that it is theoretically bound to enforce the rebate and twist-
ing laws. CAL. INS. CODE § 758 (Deering 1976) states that "[e]very insurer shall exercise
reasonable diligence in securing the observance of [the unlawful rebates, profits and com-
missions statutes] by its agents."
30. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 331 (concealment), 338 (intentional or fraudulent omis-
sion by insured of matters proving or tending to prove the falsity of a warranty), 359 (repre-
sentation false in material point), 447 (violation of material warranty or other provision of
policy), 1904 (intentionally false representation by insured with respect to policy of marine
insurance), 2030 (increased risk due to alteration in use or condition of subject matter in-
sured under policy of fire insurance) (Deering 1976).
31. CAL. INS. CODE § 41 (Deering 1976).
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same as existing statutory provisions relating to the same subject matter
shall be construed as restatements and continuations thereof, and not
as new enactments."32 Courts freely apply the provisions of other Cali-
fornia Codes in cases involving insurance, subject only to the rule that
"a special statute dealing with a particular subject [Insurance Code
provision] takes priority over the general statute."33 With regard to re-
scission it has been held:
[The] specification in the Insurance Code of circumstances
under which a party to an insurance contract may rescind
does not mean that rescission in any such case is the exclusive
remedy. These provisions of the Insurance Code are in the
nature of special provisions pertaining to insurance contracts,
which are superimposed upon those provisions of law which
govern contracts generally.
34
A. Groundsfor Rescission
Section 1689(b) of the Civil Code sets forth the grounds that a
party may rely on to rescind unilaterally a contract. The most useful to
an insurer victim of agent fraud is that the contract is unlawful35 or that
there was a partial or total failure of consideration.
36
1. Unlawfulness of the contract as ground for rescission
Under section 1689(b)(5) of the Civil Code, a party to a contract
32. CAL. INS. CODE § 2 (Deering 1976).
33. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wolff, 72 Cal. App. 3d 537, 542, 140 Cal. Rptr. 164, 167
(1977).
34. De Campos v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 122 Cal. App. 2d 519, 529, 265 P.2d
617, 622 (1954).
35. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1689(b)(5) (Deering 1976) provides that "[a] party to a contract
may rescind the contract.. . (5) [i]f the contract is unlawful for causes which do not appear
in its terms or conditions, and the parties are not equally at fault."
36. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1689(b)(2) (Deering 1976) provides that "[a] party to a contract
may rescind the contract . . . (2) if the consideration for the obligation of the rescinding
party fails, in whole or in part, through the fault of the party as to whom he rescinds."
Cases addressing arguments based on prejudice of the public interest, as set forth in
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1689(b)(6) (Deering 1976) and contravention of public policy generally,
contain strong language limiting the circumstances under which a contract ought to be held
void as against public policy. For example, in Vick v. Patterson, 158 Cal. App. 2d 414, 417,
322 P.2d 548, 550 (1958), the court stated that rescission should occur "only in cases where
the dangerous tendency clearly and unequivocally appears from the contract itself." (quot-
ing Maryland Casualty Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 71 Cal. App. 492, 497, 236 P. 210,
213 (1925)). An argument for rescission based upon public policy considerations is weaker
and less predictable than an argument based upon any of the other grounds set forth in CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1689. People ex rel. Mosk v. Barenfeld, 203 Cal. App. 2d 166, 182, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 501, 510-11 (1962).
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may rescind the contract if it is unlawful for causes which do not ap-
pear in its terms or conditions and the parties are not equally at fault.
Hence, an insurer might argue that an insurance contract issued pursu-
ant to a rebate agreement is unlawful for causes which do not appear in
its terms or conditions because it grows immediately out of an unlawful
collateral agreement.
An unlawful contract is one which is "1. Contrary to an express
provision of law; 2. Contrary to the policy of express law, though not
expressly prohibited; or 3. Otherwise contrary to good morals."37 A
rebate agreement not only violates an express provision of the law as
set forth in Insurance Code sections 750, 751,38 10113 39 but it is also
contrary to the policy of section 1668 of the Civil Code, which provides
that "[a]ll contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly
. . . violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the pol-
icy of the law."4
The court in Miller v. California Roofing Co.,41 applied such an
analysis to a suit by a corporate manager to rescind a purchase of stock
on the ground that the initial collection of consideration violated provi-
sions of the Corporate Securities Act which prohibited collection of any
portion of the consideration to be paid on account of a subscription
before a permit authorizing such collection was issued. Subsequent
transfer of the shares comported with statutory provisions. The court
of appeal, in affirming the lower court's decision in favor of the defend-
ant corporation, stated that a court cannot legally lend its aid to enforce
either an illegal agreement or the results of one.42 However, the court
held in favor of the corporation because the plaintiff manager there was
in part delicto with the corporation and therefore not entitled to
recovery.43
Although the statute violated by the collection of consideration in
Miller is different from those in a rebate agreement, the factors al-
lowing rescission in each case are identical, i.e., illegality of the agree-
ment and parties not equally at fault.
It has been held that:
'The test. . . [of] whether a demand connected with an illegal
37. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1667 (Deering 1976).
38. See supra notes 3 & 4 and accompanying text.
39. CAL. INS. CODE § 10113 (Deering 1976) provides that the policy shall "be deemed to
constitute the entire contract between the parties."
40. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (Deering 1976).
41. 55 Cal. App. 2d 136, 130 P.2d 740 (1942).
42. Id. at 141, 130 P.2d at 744.
43. Id. at 145-46, 130 P.2d at 746.
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transaction is capable of being enforced at law, is whether the
plaintiff requires the aid of the illegal transaction to establish
his case. If the plaintiff cannot open his case without showing
that he has broken the law, the court will not assist him,
whatever his claim in justice may be upon the defendant.'"
In C.Z T Corp. v. Breckenridge,45 the court of appeal affirmed the lower
court decision that, where the plaintiff had no need to prove an illegal
transaction to recover on a promissory note, he might recover.46 In
contrast, were an insured to bring action against an insurer under an
insurance contract, it would be necessary to allege a valid contract, in-
cluding the payment of consideration under the terms of the policy.
Because a rebate agreement involves the basic consideration given for
an insurance contract,47 an insured plaintiff would be unable to estab-
lish his case without alleging the illegal transaction.
The second prong of the test may also be met because the parties
to an insurance contract may not be equally at fault if an insured has
committed a misdemeanor.
Under Insurance Code section 752,48 in order to commit a misde-
meanor, the insured must "knowingly" accept or receive the unlawful
rebate. Thus, if it can be shown that the insured knew that he or she
was accepting a rebate and knew it to be illegal, the insurer could re-
scind the contract under Civil Code section 1689(b)(5). However, is an
insured who is aware that he is accepting a rebate but does not know of
its illegality acting "knowingly" as used in Insurance Code section 752?
Although "knowingly" is not defined in the Insurance Code, it seems
likely that the Penal Code definition would pertain to criminal statutes
contained in other Codes as well, at least where the term is undefined
by the Code in which a criminal statute is found. Section 7 of the Penal
Code defines the word "knowingly" as "import[ing] only a knowledge
that the facts exist which bring the act or omission within the provisions
of this code. It does not require any knowledge of the unlawfulness of
such act or omission."
49
Insureds in general, whether or not they have actual knowledge
that a rebate agreement violates the provisions of Insurance Code sec-
44. C.I.T. Corp. v. Breckenridge, 63 Cal. App. 2d 198, 200, 146 P.2d 271, 272 (1944)
(quoting Berka v. Woodward, 125 Cal. 119, 127, 57 P. 777, 779-80 (1899) (quoting Swan v.
Scott, 11 Serg. & Rawle 164 (1824))).
45. 63 Cal. App. 2d 198, 146 P.2d 271 (1944).
46. Id. at 200, 146 P.2d at 272.
47. See infra Section III. A. 2.
48. See supra note 3.
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(5) (Deering 1976).
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tion 750, must be aware of the existence of the facts which bring the
rebate within the provisions of that section, i.e., that the rebate applied
to the first year premiums specified in the policy. An insured is pre-
sumed to know the contents of his insurance policy, at least those pro-
visions contained in clear and unequivocal language.5
2. Failure of consideration as ground for rescission
Most life insurance policies provide that the consideration for issu-
ing the policy is the application for insurance and payment of the first
premium. Three provisions of section 1689(b) of the Civil Code pro-
vide for rescission based upon failure of consideration. A party to the
contract may rescind under section 1689(b)(2) "[i]f the consideration
for the obligation of the rescinding party fails, in whole or in part,
through the fault of the party as to whom he rescinds."'" A party may
rescind under section 1689(b)(3) "[i]f the consideration for the obliga-
tion of the rescinding party becomes entirely void from any cause." 52
Finally, a party may rescind under section 1689(b)(4) if such considera-
tion fails in a material respect before it is given to the rescinding
party.
5 3
Section 1607 of the Civil Code provides that "consideration of a
contract must be lawful within the meaning of section sixteen hundred
and sixty-seven. '5 4 As previously stated, section 1667 defines unlawful
as "1. Contrary to an express provision of law; 2. Contrary to the policy
of express law, though not expressly prohibited; or, 3. Otherwise con-
trary to good morals." Contracts which have wilful or negligent viola-
tion of the law directly or indirectly as their purpose are against the
policy of law.55
In a rebate scheme, the method of payment of the first-year pre-
mium violates the express provisions of sections 750-767 of the Insur-
ance Code 6 and is therefore unlawful consideration under section
1667(1) of the Civil Code. And, under section 1608 of the Civil Code,
if any part of several considerations for a single object is unlawful, the
50. Rice v. California-Western States Life Ins. Co., 21 Cal. App. 2d 660, 670, 70 P.2d
516, 521 (1937). However, there may be circumstances where the insurer's own conduct is
such that even a technical misdemeanor violation by the insured will not obviate liability
under the contract. See discussion of Homestead, infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
51. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1689(b)(2) (Deering 1976).
52. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1689(b)(3) (Deering 1976).
53. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1689(b)(4) (Deering 1976).
54. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1607 (Deering 1976).
55. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1667 (Deering 1976).
56. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
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entire contract is void. 7
In order for the insurer to rescind under Civil Code section
1689(b)(2), failure of consideration must occur through the fault of the
insured. As previously discussed, where the insured has actual knowl-
edge that a rebate agreement violates provisions of the Insurance Code,
fault may be easily inferred." Where the insured has knowledge only
of the facts bringing a rebate agreement within the proscriptions of the
Insurance Code, a finding that he is at fault would arguably depend
upon whether the Penal Code definition of "knowingly" applies to a
criminal statute found in the Insurance Code section 752.
59
If the insurer seeks to rescind based on section 1689(b)(3), the con-
sideration for the insurance contract must be entirely void. Considera-
tion for an insurance contract consists of both the premium and the
application. As previously noted, the premium payment is void be-
cause of illegality. The application would probably be void as well be-
cause representations about premium payment are required in a well-
drafted insurance application, and commonly incorporated into the
contract and, often, into policy delivery forms.6" Thus, both parts of
the consideration, the premium and the application, can be considered
void and the contract rescinded under section 1689(b)(3).
If an insurer can show that an illegal payment of a first premium
constitutes a "material" failure of consideration, then section
1689(b)(4) may be applicable. The test of materiality, at least with re-
gard to misrepresentations, "is that the contract sought to be rescinded
would not have been made if the representation had been absent."'" It
has not been determined whether the same test of materiality would
apply where the failure of consideration consists of payment of the in-
sured's initial premiums by the agent. Assuming the same test applies,
it would probably not be difficult for an insurer to show that insurance
rates and commissions are based upon the premise that an insured is
57. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1608 provides that "[i]f any part of single consideration for one or
more objects, or of several considerations for a single object, is unlawful, the entire contract
is void."
58. See supra text accompanying note 50.
59. See supra note 3 and text accompanying note 50.
60. For example, applicants may be asked to certify that they have paid the full pre-
mium due, that they have not received any consideration other than the insurance coverage
for doing so, and that they understand that their insurance coverage is dependent upon the
fact that they paid for the policy and received no inducements from the agent or other third
party other than the terms of the insurance contract itself.
61. Shirreffs v. Alta Canyada Corp., 8 Cal. App. 2d 742, 748, 48 P.2d 55, 58 (1935)
(citing Colton v. Stanford, 82 Cal. 351, 399, 23 P. 16, 28 (1890); Craig v. Shea, 45 Cal. App.
351, 354, 188 P. 73, 74 (1919)).
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less likely to allow his policy to lapse after the first year, leaving the
insurers with a net loss, if he himself has paid the first year premiums,
and that the insurance contract would not have been made if the in-
surer had known that the agent was providing the first year premiums.
Other potentially material misrepresentations-such as income, other
insurance, and other applications-may also be involved in rebate
cases.
B. Refund of Premiums as Condition Precedent to Rescission of
Insurance Contracts
The Insurance Code does not specify a procedure by which to re-
scind a life insurance contract. The Civil Code, however, sets forth a
procedure to be followed by a party in rescinding a contract. Section
1691 provides that:
Subject to Section 1693, to effect a rescission a party to the
contract must, promptly upon discovering the facts which en-
title him to rescind if he is free from duress, menace, undue
influence or disability and is aware of his right to rescind:
(a) Give notice of rescission to the party as to whom he re-
scinds; and
(b) Restore to the other party everything of value which he
has received from him under the contract or offer to restore
the same upon condition that the other party do likewise, un-
less the latter is unable or positively refuses to do so.
When notice of rescission has not otherwise been given or an
offer to restore the benefits received under the contract has
not otherwise been made, the service of a pleading in an ac-
tion or proceeding that seeks relief based on rescission shall
be deemed to be such notice of offer or both.6 2
Section 1693,63 referred to above, deals with the effect upon relief of
any delay in notice of rescission or in restoration of benefits. It
provides:
When relief based upon rescission is claimed in an action or
proceeding, such relief shall not be denied because of delay in
giving notice of rescission unless such delay has been substan-
tially prejudicial to the other party. A party who has received
benefits by reason of a contract that is subject to rescission
and who in an action or proceeding seeks relief based upon
62. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1691 (Deering 1976).
63. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1693 (Deering 1976).
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rescission shall not be denied relief because of a delay in re-
storing or in tendering restoration of such benefits before
judgment unless such delay has been substantially prejudicial
to the other party; but the court may make a tender of restora-
tion a condition of its judgment.
Accordingly, an insurer seeking to rescind is theoretically required
to return the premiums received in order to restore the parties, as
nearly as possible, to their original positions. Even where a contract is
rescinded because of fraud, the value received must be tendered by the
rescinding party.' However, there are some exceptions. For example,
a rescission is effected without tender where the rescinding party is ad-
judged to have received nothing of value.65 Rescission without tender
may also be allowed if the amount of money, if any, to be returned and
the proper person to whom it would be returnable are far from clear.
In Sutter Street R.A Co. v. Baum,66 an action was brought to rescind
several promissory notes and a mortgage given by a corporation for
money borrowed from a director on the ground of fraud. In affirming
the lower court's decision in favor of the plaintiff corporation, the
supreme court held that plaintiff was not required to return the money
from the director prior to rescission where plaintiff offered to comply
with all the terms imposed by the court as conditions to a decree in its
behalf, and offered to refund to the defendants any and all sums of
money received from either of them, together with interest thereon, as
may be just and equitable after an accounting.67
Various factors outside of the terms of the contract will determine
the amount of premium payments, if any, to be refunded. The Insur-
ance Code contains three pertinent provisions dealing with the return
of premiums. Under section 481(a)(1), unless the policy provides
otherwise, the insured is entitled to return of the whole premium if the
policy is canceled or rescinded if the insurer has not been exposed to
any risk of loss. 68 Section 482 provides that "[e]xcept as provided by
section 481, or by the insurance contract, if a peril insured against has
existed, and the insurer has been liable for any period, however, short,
the insured is not entitled to return of premiums, so far as that particu-
64. Williams v. Smith, 127 Cal. App. 2d 607, 612, 274 P.2d 204, 207 (1954).
65. Modoc Mineral & Oil Co. v. Cal-Vada Drilling & Exploration Co., 236 Cal. App. 2d
868, 873, 46 Cal. Rptr. 508, 511 (1965).
66. 66 Cal. 44, 4 P. 916 (1884).
67. Id. at 52-53, 4 P. at 918. This ruling was cited with approval in Conforti v.
Dunmeyer, 209 Cal. App. 2d 41, 47, 25 Cal. Rptr. 504, 508 (1962).
68. CAL. INS. CODE § 481(a)(1) (Deering Supp. 1983).
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lar risk is concerned."69 Section 483 provides that:
A person is entitled to a return of the premium:
(a) When the contract is voidable, on account of the fraud
or misrepresentation of the insurer.
(b) When the contract is voidable on account of facts, of the
existence of which the insured was ignorant without his fault.
(c) When, by any default of the insured other than actual
fraud, the insurer did not incur any liability under the
policy.
70
The applicability of Insurance Code sections 481 and 482 to life
insurance policies was explained in Equitable Life Assurance Society of
the United States v. Johnson .7 In that case, the court of appeal, inter-
preting the applicability of a tax levied upon "gross premiums received
• . . less return premiums," considered whether the consideration re-
ceived by an insurer upon the sale of annuity contracts falls within the
meaning of "gross premiums received" and whether refunds and cash
values to holders of annuity contracts are "return premiums." In af-
firming the trial court's finding that such consideration is included in
"gross premiums" and that the term "return premiums" includes cash
surrender values paid on cancellation of annuity contracts, the court in
dicta discussed the applicability of Insurance Code sections 481 and
482 to life insurance contracts. The court stated that:
They [Insurance Code sections 481 and 482] are obviously ap-
plicable to insurance such as fire insurance, but less obviously
applicable to life insurance or annuities. However, section
2619 of the Civil Code, as originally enacted provided: "A
person insured is entitled to a return of the premium when the
contract is voidable, on account of the fraud or misrepresenta-
tion of the insurer, or on account of facts, of the existence of
which the insured was ignorant without his fault; or when, by
any default of the insured other than actual fraud, the insurer
never incurred any liability under the policy." Clearly, that
section could, and does, apply to life insurance and annuity
policies. The other sections do not suggest what should be
done on the cancellation of a life policy or an annuity
policy.
72
The court illustrated the meaning of "return premium" with the follow-
69. CAL. INS. CODE § 482 (Deering 1976).
70. CAL. INS. CODE § 483 (Deering 1976).
71. 53 Cal. App. 2d 49, 127 P.2d 95 (1942).
72. Id. at 73-74, 127 P.2d at 108.
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ing example: "In connection with a life policy, the most obvious illus-
tration [of a return premium] is where the premium is paid, but, before
the policy takes effect, it is cancelled because of fraud."73 Johnson is
quoted in Jennings v. Prudential Insurance Co., 7 4 which involved the
applicability of section 481 where the life insurance policy had been
surrendered to the insurer for its cash value a few days before the in-
sured's death and where the policy would have remained in force for
about ten more days. The insurer paid the cash value of the policy
computed to the last day at paid-up premium but did not return the
premium for the ten days remaining in force. The court of appeal af-
firmed the trial court's judgment for the insurer, holding that even if
section 481 were applicable to life insurance policies, the policy did not
remain in force simply because the insurer failed to return the
unearned premium.75
The 1977 amendment to section 481 added subdivision (c), provid-
ing that the section "shall not apply to policies of ocean marine insur-
ance." 76  It seems that, had the legislature wished to exclude life
insurance policies from the coverage of section 481, it would have done
so. In addition, both Johnson and Jennings discuss the return of premi-
ums in the context of payment of the policy's cash surrender value.
Therefore, by their terms, sections 481 and 482 as well as 483, should
apply to life insurance policies issued pursuant to a rebate scheme.
However, those statutes do not, in any way, require the return of a
premium as a condition precedent to rescission. They merely provide
that the insured is entitled to the return if the policy is cancelled or
rescinded and the specified conditions exist.7 7 As discussed above, sec-
73. Id. at 73, 127 P.2d at 107.
74. 48 Cal. App. 3d 8, 121 Cal. Rtpr. 125 (1975).
75. Id. at 18-19, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
76. CAL. INS. CODE § 481(c) (Deering Supp. 1983).
77. If an insurer's right to the premium was disputed by the insured, or the former agent,
the rule in Wagner v. Worrell, 76 Cal. App. 2d 172, 172 P.2d 751 (1946), would be applica-
ble. In that case, plaintiff, executor of his father's estate, brought an action to quiet title to a
bank account against an association for whose use and benefit decedent carried on an insur-
ance business. In affirming the lower court's judgment for defendant, the court of appeal
held the following:
This suit to quiet title to personal property is of course subject to the same rules
as those prevailing in similar suits respecting real property, and the rule is settled
by a long line of cases that when it has been determined that the plaintiff in a quiet
title suit has no interest in the property in controversy "'the case is ended. ...
The want of title in plaintiff renders it unnecessary to examine the title of
defendant.'"
Id. at 179-80, 172 P.2d at 756 (citation omitted). Thus, if an insured or an agent failed to
establish his right to the premium money, an insurer could hold the money without the
necessity of showing its own right to do so. However, if an insurer sought a declaratory
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tion 1691 of the Civil Code sets forth the requirements for an effective
rescission.
78
It is unlikely that an insurer victimized by a rebate scheme could
ever be required to return to an agent the premium paid by him on
behalf of the insured. Under such circumstances, the money is paid
under the terms of an illegal rebate agreement as consideration for the
insured's applying for the life insurance policy. In Manfeld v. Hyde,"
for example, plaintiff sued defendant for money which plaintiff paid
under a contract for the care of a minor child. Defendant cross-com-
plained for money still owed under the contract. The contract was held
to be illegal because defendant was unlicensed and therefore in viola-
tion of provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code making it a
misdemeanor to engage in child care without a permit. In reversing the
lower court's judgment for defendant on the cross-complaint, the court
of appeal held that plaintiff could not recover money already paid to
defendant under the contract. The court stated that:
It is a well settled general rule that a party to an illegal con-
tract may not obtain the aid of the courts either to enforce
such agreement directly or to recover any consideration
parted with pursuant thereto; the law leaves the parties where
it finds them. Nor does there appear here to be any basis for
application of the recognized qualification to this general rule,
that a party not equally at fault may secure relief from the
consequences of an illegal agreement.80
Although agents involved in a rebate scheme do not violate a li-
censing statute, their rebate agreements, like the child care contract in
Mansfield, violate statutes passed to protect the public against certain
acts. In both cases, violation of the statutes constitutes a misdemeanor.
The plaintiff in Mansfield, although not innocent, behaved in a far less
reprehensible manner than most agents who rebate. Therefore, as be-
tween an insurer and its former agents, it is unlikely that the agents
would be allowed to recover the premium payments.
judgment, under § 1060 of the Civil Code, that the policies were validly rescinded, the in-
surer would be the moving party and might be required to establish the validity of its title to
the premium money.
78. See supra text accompanying note 63.
79. 112 Cal. App. 2d 133, 245 P.2d 577 (1952).
80. Id. at 139, 245 P.2d at 582 (citations omitted).
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C Return of Premiums as Condition Precedent to Recovery of
Commissions
Under section 483(c) of the Insurance Code, an insured is entitled
to a return of premium "[w]hen, by any default of the insured other
than actual fraud, the insurer did not incur any liability under the pol-
icy."'s  Therefore, even where the insurer incurred no liability, an in-
sured who committed actual fraud is not entitled to a return of
premium. A similar prohibition would be applicable against an agent
who defrauds his principal by paying the premium himself.
In addition, most agent contracts provide that, should a premium
be refunded "for any reason," the agent must repay the compensation
he received. In cases involving agent fraud, an insurer should be able
to attempt to recover commissions-at least those in excess of premi-
ums-without refunding the premiums. Furthermore, if an insurer dis-
covers the rebate scheme before paying commissions, it is probably
entitled to hold the commissions as well as retain the premiums.
The applicable rule of law is stated in Restatement (Second) of
Agency section 469:
An agent is entitled to no compensation for conduct which is
disobedient or which is a breach of his duty of loyalty; if such
conduct constitutes a willful and deliberate breach of his con-
tract of service, he is not entitled to compensation even for
properly performed services for which no compensation is
apportioned.
82
IV. ENFORCEABILITY OF ILLEGAL REBATE AGREEMENTS
Although a rebate agreement is illegal, it still may have legal ef-
fect. A distinction is made in the cases between two kinds of illegal
agreements. The first involves violation of a statute that explicitly pro-
vides that an act in violation of that statute cannot be the basis of re-
covery. A court will leave the parties to such an agreement where it
finds them. For example, in Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons,83 a sub-
contractor, unlicensed in violation of the Business and Professions
Code licensing statute, was not allowed to recover for work it had per-
formed even though the general contractor had been paid in full for
that work. In affirming the judgment for defendants, the California
81. CAL. INS. CODE § 483(c) (Deering 1976).
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 469 (1958) (emphasis added); see also J.C.
Peacock, Inc. v. Hasko, 196 Cal. App. 2d 353, 358, 16 Cal. Rptr. 518, 522 (1961).
83. 48 Cal. 2d 141, 308 P.2d 713 (1957).
1984]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court relied on section 7031 of the Business and Professions
Code which provides that:
No person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of
a contractor, may bring or maintain any action in any court of
this state for the collection of compensation for the perform-
ance of any act or contract for which a license is required by
this chapter without alleging and proving that he was a duly
licensed contractor at all times during the performance of
such act or contract . . 4
The court, in dicta, stated that:
[E]ven in the absence of a provision such as section 7031, the
courts generally will not enforce an illegal bargain or lend
their assistance to a party who seeks compensation for an ille-
gal act. The reason for this refusal is not that the courts are
unaware of possible injustice between the parties, and that the
defendant may be left in possession of some benefit he should
in good conscience turn over to the plaintiff, but that this con-
sideration is outweighed by the importance of deterring illegal
conduct.
8 5
The court in Lewis & Queen discussed the kind of illegal act which
involves a statute prohibiting certain conduct by providing for a fine or
administrative discipline and which "excludes by implication the addi-
tional penalty involved in holding the illegal contract unenforceable." 6
A rebate agreement is not explicitly made unenforceable by statute.
Although giving and knowingly receiving illegal rebates are misde-
meanors according to sections 752 and 761 of the Insurance Code,8 7 the
Penal Code does not provide that contracts involving misdemeanors
are unenforceable. It provides only that, unless another penalty is pre-
scribed, "every offense declared to be a misdemeanor is punishable by
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by fine
not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by both."88 The analysis of the
enforceability of illegal contracts presented in Homestead Supplies, Inc.
v. Executive L[/e Ins. Co.,89 is therefore applicable.
In Homestead, plaintiff-insured sought a declaration of the correct
amount of the annual premium due under a policy of life insurance
84. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031 (Deering 1976).
85. 48 Cal. 2d at 150, 308 P.2d at 719.
86. Id. at 151, 308 P.2d at 719.
87. See supra notes 2, 3, 50 and accompanying text.
88. CAL. PENAL CODE § 19 (Deering 1976).
89. 81 Cal. App. 3d 978, 147 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1978).
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issued to plaintiff by defendant on the life of plaintiff's president. De-
fendant's agent originally quoted prices lower than those contained in a
later written proposal. When questioned, defendant's agent indicated
that the policy could be issued for the lower premiums originally
quoted. They were then penciled in on the written proposal.
The insurance policy as issued specified the correct premiums for
the first seven years and incorrect renewal premiums thereafter. Upon
plaintiff's request, defendant's president wrote that the insurer would
accept the lower renewal premiums. Plaintiff paid the specified premi-
ums until six years later when defendant demanded the higher renewal
premium. Plaintiff paid the higher premium and brought an action
against defendant.
The trial court entered judgment in favor of defendant. The court
of appeal reversed, holding that plaintiff had supplied valuable consid-
eration for the modification of the insurance contract. The court held
that, even assuming that the modification agreement violated both re-
bate and price discrimination provisions of the Insurance Code, the il-
legality was not such as to render the agreement unenforceable under
the circumstances of the case. In reaching its conclusion, the court
stated that:
[Tihe effect of illegality on the enforceability of an agreement
depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case
including the kind and degree of illegality involved, the pub-
lic policy or policies to be served, whether those policies will
best be served by enforcing the agreement or denying enforce-
ment and the relative culpability and equities of the parties. 90
The court also listed several factors which the courts have consid-
ered when determining the enforceability of an illegal agreement, in-
cluding whether the violation of law involved serious moral turpitude,
whether the parties are inpari delicto, whether the adverse party would
be unjustly enriched, whether the forfeiture would be disproportion-
ately harsh if enforcement were denied and whether the purpose of the
violated statute would best be served by enforcement or denial of
enforcement. 9'
The Executive Life agent in Homestead was, at worst, negligent in
failing to quote accurately the premiums payable. The new terms were
penciled in and the president of the insurance company promised, in
writing, to accept lower premiums. This constitutes clear ratification of
90. Id. at 989, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 27-28.
91. Id. at 990-91, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
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the modification agreement.92 In addition, by accepting benefits under
the policy for six years before complaining of the invalidity of the
agreement regarding renewal premiums, the insurer probably waived
any right to attack that agreement later.
An important difference between Homestead and most rebate
cases involves the insured's knowledge of the illegality involved in the
modification agreement and the rebate agreement. In Homestead, the
insured did not realize that the modification agreement was anything
more than a correction, making the written contract conform to the true
agreement between himself and the agent. Therefore, not only was he
ignorant of the fact that the agreement violated the Insurance Code,
but he did not even know of the existence of facts which brought the
agreement within the provisions of the statutes that were violated. The
insured was, therefore, justified in relying upon the insurance agree-
ment as modified. The court assumed that the modification agreement
violated the rebate and discrimination provisions because findings of
fact were not requested and therefore the court "presume[d] in favor of
the judgment every finding of fact necessary to support it warranted by
the evidence."93
However, the court of appeal based its reversal of the judgment for
defendant upon the facts of the case indicating that the insurer ratified
and waived objections to the contract while the insured was justified in
viewing the contract as the original agreement between the insured and
the Executive Life agent. The court did not conceal its reservations in
this regard:
We are not entirely convinced that either the unlawful re-
bate or unfair rate discrimination provisions were meant to
apply to a situation such as that in the case at bench, namely,
an apparently good faith mistake in the quotation of premi-
ums by an agent of the insurer followed by an apparently
good faith agreement of the insurer to stand behind the repre-
sentations of its agent. On the other hand, as the president of
a life insurance company, defendant's president should cer-
tainly have been aware of the statutes prohibiting rate dis-
crimination and rebate of premiums. In any event, for
92. Principles of agency law also dictated that Executive Life was responsible to the
insured for the negligent acts of its agents. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2338 (Deering 1976). How-
ever, most insurers, as indicated above, protect themselves from liability by provisions in
their insurance contracts which specify that only an officer of the company is authorized to
alter the policy or to waive any of the company's rights or requirements and that any change
in a policy will be valid only when endorsed by a company officer. See supra note 21.
93. 81 Cal. App. 3d at 984, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
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purposes of decision, we shall assume, without deciding, the
modification agreement was violative of both the rebate and
price discrimination statutory provisions.94
Finally, neither party in Homestead wanted to avoid the life insur-
ance policy based upon illegality derived from the modification agree-
ment. Both parties wanted the insurance policy to continue in force-
plaintiff at the lower modified rates and defendant at the rates printed
in the policy. The Homestead court found that the equities of the case
dictated that the modification agreement be enforced and the question
of enforceability of the life insurance contract itself was not considered.
If insurance contracts are properly subject to rescission, the court may
remedy any resultant inequity under authority of section 1692 of the
Civil Code, which provides that the court may require the party to
whom relief is granted to make any compensation to the other which
justice may require and may otherwise in its judgment adjust the equi-
ties between the parties.95
V. AVOIDING AND RESPONDING TO INSURANCE AGENT FRAUD
A. Avoidance
Juxtaposed against agents' considerable authority and the substan-
tial risks insurance companies are taking in entering into agreements
with them, the ease with which some insurance companies do so is re-
markable. Many insurance companies rely substantially, and often en-
tirely, on insurance department licensing procedures and perhaps a
routine, and often incomplete, commercial background report. At very
little cost, much more complete information could be obtained. Insur-
ance Departments make available to the public printouts of agents' li-
censing history and a listing of companies with which he or she has
been affiliated. A simple review of this information may reveal a pat-
tern of switching from company to company which may indicate a con-
tinuing rebate and twisting scheme.
Some companies are known within the industry to offer very high
commissions on certain whole-life policies while maintaining lax un-
derwriting standards. These companies are recurrent targets of rebat-
ing and twisting schemes and their appearance in an insurance agent's
background may suggest potential problems.
Merely inquiring about an agent in the insurance community in
which he or she operates may also be helpful. It, is remarkable how
94. Id. at 986-87, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
95. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1692 (Deering 1976).
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many times an insurance agent may commit fraud on one company
after another simply because an insurer's associations and contacts
within the community where he or she operates are never checked.
Many insurers maintain regional vice president or regional direc-
tor systems specifically to provide this local contact. However, the
value of such regional officers is often undercut by compensation agree-
ments which make their income dependent, in whole or in part, upon
agent production. This can be an invitation for a regional vice presi-
dent or regional director to actively recruit agents known for their loose
operating procedures.
The second opportunity insurers have to act against agents' fraud-
ulent practices is in the drafting of insurance policies, insurance appli-
cations, agent contracts and policy delivery forms. The common
practice of allowing agents to enjoy the "float" on premium collections,
widely prevalent in the credit industry, can be an invitation for theft.
To prevent siphoning off of premium funds, "controlled reinsurance"
arrangements must be closely monitored. Under such arrangements,
an agent-owned reinsurance company benefits from the long-term in-
vestment income from a block of business. Allowing agents to receive
policyholder remittances in their own names, rather than in the name
of the company, may open the door to rebates. The not uncommon
practice of allowing agents to "net" their premiums against commis-
sions by submitting only an insurance application and receiving back a
commission in excess of premiums is certainly foolhardy. Insurers
would be better protected by insisting upon direct remittances to them-
selves or, at the least, "lock-box" accounts to which the agent has no
access. Failure to maintain the trust status of premiums can also pre-
vent preferential recovery when an agent or administrator goes bank-
rupt. Agent initiated changes in the way premiums are paid-such as
annualizations of what had been monthly premium payments-should
be closely watched.
Policy and application language can also be tightened up consider-
ably. Applications should include explicit statements by both the pro-
spective policyholder and the agent that the policyholder is paying the
full premium for the policy, without any other consideration from the
agent. Policies and applications should state more explicitly that the
agent has no authority to modify the premiums or to provide any in-
ducement for acceptance of the contract other than that which is stated
in such policy. The policies and application should contain a statement
that both the agent and the insured understand the agent's limited
authority.
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Assistance from an agent in processing premium loans should be
more strongly discouraged. In only a few instances is "mini-dip-
ping"-paying a minimal deposit and recovering the remainder of the
premium from cash values-in an insured's true economic interest.
Language about the policy's premium payment can also be included in
policy delivery forms. Such forms should be an express part of the
contract and incorporated into its terms. Not only would such changes
lessen the likelihood of premium fund, rebating and twisting problems,
but, as importantly, it would make the insurer's case against both agent
and policyholder easier to prove when violations do occur.
The third, and usually final, opportunity the insurer has to check
agent fraud is at the underwriting stage. Underwriters as well as mar-
keting personnel should closely follow agent production. A new agent
who immediately becomes an insurer's leading producer should be
closely scrutinized as well as rewarded. It may be that his or her high
volume is not wholly due to a strong product and a winning personal-
ity. However, to the extent underwriting functions are delegated to
third-party administrators independent of the insurer itself, often with
compensation arrangements tied to production, the insurer will lose the
ability to monitor the underwriting.
Although the general principles of agency law have not been over-
turned as yet, increasing scrutiny is being levelled at insurers who have
entered into relationships with third-party administrators, particularly
in the context of multiple-employer trusts ("METs"). Efforts are being
made to impose liability upon such insurers for the unauthorized acts
of the METs and third-party administrators.96 Judicial and statutory
law could modify insurers' responsibility for their agents' acts in all
cases if these efforts show success.
Insurers face another problem involving payments for administra-
tive services to third-party administrators, particularly in cases where
the insured self-administers its own insurance program. Such pay-
ments can be construed as unlawful rebates where they are covers for
illegal commission splitting and do not relate to reasonable charges for
the services rendered.
97
96. Insurers May Have to Pay Bills, Trustee afHealth Plan Contends, Los Angeles Times,
Oct. 25, 1982, § 4, at 1, col. 4.
97. Associated California Loggers, Inc. v. Kinder, 110 Cal. App. 3d 673, 681, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 67, 71 (1980).
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B. Resvonding
Under section 758 of the Insurance Code,98 an insurer has an obli-
gation to enforce the rebating and twisting provisions of the code. Its
obligation should be satisfied by reporting a potential rebating situation
to the Insurance Department. Whether or not the insurer decides to
take further action depends upon the risks present. Because of the mul-
titude of witnesses necessary to construct a rebate or twisting case, they
are extremely expensive. Only when there are realistic and highly
probable threats of large death claims by purported insureds can these
cases be justified on economic grounds. If the insurer is faced with
only a very few rebate situations, where the policies are about to expire,
and a thorough review of the underwriting files indicates a low risk of
death claims, the insurer may be well advised either to take very mild
action to preserve a possible defense against an allegation of ratifica-
tion, or to take no action at all.
An insurer should never count on recovering its commissions in
excess of premiums from insurance agents who committed fraud on the
insurer.99 As a practical matter, these agents have means of concealing
assets which are, in most cases, invulnerable to conventional discovery.
Auditing considerations may also make aggressive action costly. As-
suming a decision is made to take action against an agent in a rebating,
twisting or premium trust fund situation, prompt investigation of po-
tential involvement of company officers, agency officials and under-
writers should be undertaken. Even where there is no direct
involvement, a review of insured files may reveal standards so lax that
a court could find an implied ratification of the agents' conduct on the
basis of incomplete applications, high premiums compared to applicant
incomes, over-insurance, or other factors.
Where initial action is taken against an agent, prompt settlement
after an early offense may well be in the company's best interests. In
most cases, aggressive discovery in the early stages of the action is vital
to assure that accurate testimony from third-party witnesses can be ob-
tained. Such action may also convince the agent that it is in his best
interests to cooperate. Such discovery will usually include enough poli-
cyholder depositions to develop evidence of pattern and practice. Ob-
taining records from other insurers at the outset may also help show a
history of agent and policyholder misconduct which is hard to refute.
On the other hand, a casual attitude early in the case may encourage
98. CAL. INS. CODE § 758 (Deering 1976).
99. See supra Section III.C.
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both the agent and the policyholders, often led by the agent to be con-
cerned about their own financial and legal liability, to attempt to avert
their problem through false testimony and by filing cross-actions
against the company alleging unfair competition and bad faith.
Early consideration should also be given to reporting agent fraud
to both state and federal prosecutorial authorities as well as to the state
Insurance Department.1° As a practical matter, however, it must be
recognized that these prosecutions proceed slowly, if at all. Enforce-
ment agencies generally see agent problems as matters to be resolved
by their principals. Historically, probably the best results have been
obtained by the Internal Revenue Service which is often interested in
pursuing agents, who, in order to increase the profit on fraudulent ac-
tivities, generally deduct rebates as a purported business expense. The
IRS has traditionally considered such deductions improper since the
payments are illegal. 1 ' However, in 1982, the United States Tax Court
ruled that an Ohio insurance agent was entitled to deduct $272,270 of
rebates to customers as allowable business expense because the State of
Ohio did not generally enforce the anti-rebate statutes.1
02
Insurers may also wish to consider an accusation of racketeering
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"). That federal statute rests on two concepts, a "pattern of
racketeering activity" and the definition of an "enterprise." A "pattern
of racketeering activity" is defined as two or more "acts of racketeering
activity." An "act of racketeering" is the commission of a variety of
crimes, including mail fraud and wire fraud which are often involved
in rebating and twisting schemes. An "enterprise" includes any legal
entity such as an insurance agency, as well as illegitimate organiza-
tions. When a "pattern of racketeering activity" becomes intermingled
with an "enterprise" by conducting an enterprise through racketeering
activities, the statute is violated. The advantage of a RICO allegation
is that it raises both criminal and civil claims, confers federal-often a
speedier forum than California-jurisdiction and allows a plaintiff to
sue for triple damages, costs, and attorney's fees. 1
0 3
100. The insurer reporting agent fraud to the authorities may expose itself to allegations
of defamation or invasion of privacy by those agents. See Alexander, Insurance Agent Mis-
conduct, 47 INs. COUNS. J. 558 (1980).
101. The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 24, 1979, at 1.
102. Custis v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1511 (1982).
103. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1976).
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VI. THE DEREGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
In the wake of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in
St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry, °4 Group Life and
Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co .,"os and Union Labor Lfe Insur-
ance Co. v. Pireno,106 the insurance industry has entered the greatest
period of regulatory ferment since the days of the Armstrong Commis-
sion in the early years of this century.'0 7 Whether the erosion of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act anti-trust immunity and the new interest in
market flexibility will lead to just another form of regulatory con-
straint, or in fact, to a more competitive industry is the subject of in-
tense debate.108 What does seem clear, however, is that the present role
and status of the insurance agent will come under intense scrutiny and
perhaps undergo significant change. Knowledgeable industry observ-
ers speculate that the agent fatality rate over the next decade may be as
high as eighty percent. 0 9 Some see a gradual replacement of the tradi-
tional insurance agent through direct and mass marketing and consoli-
dation of their functions with those of stockbrokers, banks and other
financial personnel and institutions.110 This would almost certainly
lead to new efforts to modify agents' roles and status as their traditional
political strength at the state level becomes diluted. This trend may be
particularly forceful at a time when agent licensing and discipline ab-
sorb approximately one-third of many Insurance Department budgets
during an era of very tight budgets.
The anti-rebating and twisting statutes are increasingly likened to
the old fair trade laws and Wall Street fixed commissions which were
104. 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
105. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
106. 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
107. See generally Gregory, Public Regulation of the Insurance Industry After Barry and
Royal Drug: McCarran-Ferguson at the End of the Decade, 16 FORUM 371 (1981-82); Hallett,
Is Time Running Out on the Insurance Industry?, Legal Times of Washington, Mar. 19, 1979,
at 14; Kennedy, The McCarran Act: A Limited "'Business of Insurance" Antitrust Exemption
Made Ever Narrower-Three Recent Decisions, 18 FORUM 528 (1983).
108. See Shenefield, Insurance-The New Frontier of Deregulation, 16 FORUM 679 (198 1-
82); Vinyard & Smith, Status Controls or State Action Immunity: Unattractive Alternativesfor
Regulating Insurers, 15 FORUM 406 (1980-81).
109. Agency Fatality Rate Put at 80% in Next Decade, The National Underwriter, Sept.
25, 1982, at 32, col. 1.
110. One commentator has recently suggested that "most policyholders are unlikely to
benefit from repeal of anti-rebate laws" and recommends savings bank life insurance as
"one of the least expensive and most accessible means for marketing low cost insurance."
Frankel, Insurance Agent Commission Deregulation: Anti-rebate Laws and an Alternatire to
Repeal, 2 J. INS. REG. 255, 263-64 (1983-84).
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abolished in 1975.111 Critics point out that the anti-rebating and twist-
ing laws are only sporadically enforced"I2 and contend that the regula-
tory lassitude which led to the Armstrong Commission proposals on
rebating and twisting in the early 1900's is long since past. Former
Wisconsin Insurance Commissioner Susan Mitchell became the first
state insurance commissioner to propose outright repeal of the anti-
rebate statutes in 1981.113 She argued that only in the insurance indus-
try does the term rebate assume an unfavorable connotation. Twisting
also can be seen as simply a form of exuberant competition controllable
by standard civil law on unfair competition and commercial
defamation.
United States Representative John LaFalce (D-N.Y.), Chairman
of the Small Business Oversight Subcommittee of the House Commit-
tee on Small Business, held hearings on his own legislation to repeal
rebate laws in September, 1981.114 While the industry has been almost
uniformly opposed to these proposals and has successfully blocked
them to date, support for them is increasing. Former California Insur-
ance Commissioner Wesley J. Kinder has even gone so far as to state
that agent examination, licensing and discipline is wasteful regulation
of an agent of an already licensed principal and should be either abol-
ished or sharply reformed.' One intermediate possibility is a quasi-
public self-regulating agents' association which would function along
the lines of the National Association of Securities Dealers or state bar
associations.
The pressure has become so great that agent groups themselves are
beginning to recognize that the days of high first-year commissions and
rapid policy turnovers are coming to an end. The head of the Califor-
nia Association of Life Underwriters has suggested a level commission
plan which would eliminate, at least partially, commission structures
which make rebating and twisting attractive."I6 Charging potential in-
sureds' fees for financial planning consulting services separate from
11I. A. TOBIAS, THE INVISIBLE BANKERS 163-66 (1982).
112. Kimball & Jackson, The Regulation of Insurance Marketing, 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 141
(1961).
113. Wisconsin Commissioner on Anti-Rebate Law Repeal, The National Underwriter,
Aug. 1, 1981, at 1.
114. See 127 CONG. REC. H6320-21 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1981) (statement of Rep.
LaFalce); Industry Associations Rally Against Rebate Bill, The National Underwriter, Sept.
26, 1981, at 1.
115. Address by Wesley J. Kinder before California Association of Life Underwriters,
Regulation-More or Less (Oct. 1979).
116. Haggerty, Cal Agents Chief Proposes Level Commission Plan, The National Under-
writer, Oct. 23, 1982, at 2, col. 2.
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commissions may be another means of placing agent-customer rela-
tionships on a more professional footing.
1 7
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite the ferment in today's insurance industry, present systems
of insurance agent regulation and discipline are not likely to change
rapidly. But if change does come slowly, it will come nonetheless. The
overwhelming majority of insurance agents are honorable and profi-
cient. The minority who are not are not being weeded out by present
policies and procedures. Insurers and those who work in the insurance
industry, therefore, must become more responsive and more attuned to
agent fraud, its prevention and its correction, if they are to maintain the
public's trust in an environment of increasing competition in the finan-
cial services industry.
117. Reaves, Fees: To Charge or Not to Charge?, The National Underwriter, Sept. 28,
1983, at 18, col. 1.
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